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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND HAROLD SHEPHERD
DISORDERLY CONDUCT
Ruthenbeck v. First Criminal Judicial Dist. Ct. of Bergen Co., N. J., 147
At. 625. What constitutes "abusive or offensive language."
Saying to police officer, "You big muttonhead, do you think you are a czar
around here?" was not an offense within ordinance forbidding the use of loud,
profane, indecent, lewd, abusive, or offensive language, enacted in accordance with
authority of Borough Act 1897, Section 28, as amended by P. L. 1900, p. 401 (1
Comp. St. 1910, p. 239); disorderly person, in the use of language, being indi-
cated by Disorderly Person Act, Section 3 (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1927), as one
indulging in and uttering loud and offensive or indecent language in public place.
EScAPE
People v. Whipple, Calif. D. C. A., 279 Pac. 1008. Justification for escape.
Defendant prosecuted for escape from a prison camp defended on the ground
that insanitary conditions existing in the camp, together with brutal and inhu-
mane treatment, was a justification. In affirming the judgment of conviction,
the court of Houser, J. said in part:
"Although authority exists to the effect that, generally speaking, absolute
necessity will excuse the commission of a criminal offense (Chesapeake & 0. R.
Co. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 519, 84 S. W. 566; Commonwealth v. Brooks, 99
Mass. 434), so far as the crime of escaping from a jail is concerned, the author-
ities are in practical accord in holding that ordinary adverse circumstances will
not preseent such a condition as will support a legal excuse for effecting an
escape. In 1 Hale, P. C. 611 (1736), it is said that 'if a prison be fired by acci-
dent, and there be a necessity to break prison to save his life, this excuseth the
felony.' The sole authority for such declaration of the common law is Coke's
Second Institutes, 590, where, without the citation of either judicial or other
authority in its support, the statement occurs that if 'a man imprisoned for petit
larceny or for killing of a man se defendendo, or by misfortune, and break prison,
it is no felony, because he shall not for the first offense subire judicium vitae
vel membri. Et sic de similibus.' But whatever may be the common law with
reference to escape, where either 'se defendendo,' misfortune, or 'first offense' is
or may be invoked as a defense to the accusation for which imprisonment has
resulted, so far as the decisions by the courts of sister states are concerned,
neither the insanitary condition of the jail (State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439, 33 Am.
Rep. 563), fear of violence from third persons (Hinkle v. Commonwealth [Ky.]
66 S. W. 816), nor unmerited punishment at the hands of the custodian (John-
son v. State, 122 Ga. 172, 50 S. E. 65) will present a situation which in the law
may be accepted as an excuse for violation of the statute."
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EXTRADITION
Ex parte McBride, Calif. D. C. A., 281 Pac. 651. Extradition of person on
parole from another state because parole revoked.
Where person on parole from Oregon committed within this state like of-
fense for which he was sentenced, he became subject to extradition when state
of Oregon revoked parole, making him fugitive from justice, under Const. U. S.
art. 4, Section 2, relating to extradition, Pen. Code, Section 1548, dealing there-
with, and Section 1203, relating to revocation of probation, and under Or. L.
Sections 1586, 1589, providing for parole and revocation of parole.
INFANTS
Richardson v. Dunn, Me., 146 Atl. 904. Effect of failure to notify parents
of arrested minhor under Probation Statute.
Under Rev. St. 1916, c. 137, Section 17, and Pub. Laws 1909, c. 263, Section
3, creating probation officer, and requiring notice of time and place of trial to
parents in case minor is detained in jail or police station, failure to notify par-
ents did not deprive court proceeding according to common law of jurisdiction
of criminal offense, or make commitment of minor convicted of larceny un-
lawful, where record did not disclose when arrest was made, or conditions under
which he was brought before court.
JURY
People v. Spinato, Calif. D. C. A., 280 Pac. 691. Waiver of jury.
Under Const. art. 1, Section 7, relative to waiver of jury in criminal cases
by consent of both parties expressed in open court, the failure of defendants to
personally expressly waive jury required a reversal, regardless of stipulation be-
tween counsel and district attorney that trial without a jury be had, since, where
the Constitution prescribes the method and form of such waiver, it cannot be
otherwise accomplished.
LARCENY
State v. Cohen, N. J., 147 AtI. 325. Illegally possessed liquor as subject of
larceny.
Though alcohol is contraband, and under National Prohibition Act, tit. 2,
Section 25 (27 USCA Section 39), no property rights exist in liquor illegally
possessed, it can be the subject of larceny or of knowingly receiving stolen prop-
erty.
SELF-INCRIMINATION
State v. Knight, N. Mex., 279 Pac. 947. Validity of statute requiring pres-
ervation of uninutilated hide of bovine animal.
Section 549, Code 1915, which requires any person killing a bovine animal
to preserve the hide unchanged and unmutilated for 30 days for inspection, does
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not conflict with Section 15, art. 2, of New Mexico Constitution protecting
against compulsory self-incrimination.
TRIAL
Cassidy v. State, Ind., 168 N. E. 19. Effect of inducing infant defendant to
forego counsel.
Where defendant 18 years old, charged with rape, was not advised as to his
constitutional rights before he testified at request of trial judge, but was in-
formed by trial judge after examination with reference to crime that court could
appoint attorney for him but that attorney would do him no good, and defend-
ant was induced to plead guilty by statements of judge and others, and evidence
showed that defendant was of low intellectuality and did not enter plea of guilty
understandingly or voluntarily, denial of motion for leave to withdraw plea of
guilty and enter plea of not guilty and plea of insanity was abuse of discretion.
State v. Finch, Kans., 280 Pac. 910. Power of Attorney General to grant im-
inunity against wishes of county attorney.
F. informed the Attorney General of the illegal operation of an alcoholic
still and was promised immunity from prosecution. Information of the still's
operation was conveyed to the sheriff and county attorney, as a result'of which
B. was arrested and pleaded guilty, but in so doing, implicated F., claiming F.
was a partner in operation of the still. F. was prosecuted by the county attorney
over objection of the Attorney General, who moved to dismiss the action. Held,
it was within the sound discretion of the Attorney General whether he would
grant immunity to F. upon whose information B. was convicted, and that under
the circumstances related in the opinion, the prosecution against F. should have
been dismissed upon motion of the Attorney General.
People v. Van Cleave, Calif., 280 Pac. 983. Misconduct of Judge.
In burglary prosecution, where court had cautioned witness not to talk with
others during recess, and after recess it appeared that she had violated injunc-
tion, statements of judge in presence of jury that he saw her talking with de-
fendant's wife and another held misconduct; he not being a witness in the case,
and no necessity being apparent why he should be called as a witness.
Patterson v. State, Okla., 280 Pac. 862. Effect of imposing penalty smaller
than fixed by law.
Where the court, in its instructions, submits to the jury a smaller penalty
for the offense than that prescribed by law, and where the defendant excepts to
such instructions and objects to the giving of the same, and where a smaller
penalty is assessed by the jury than that fixed by law, the cause will be reversed.
Edwards, P. J., dissenting.
